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Introduction
The arrival of Europeans in North America had a profound impact on the Aboriginal peoples who
had been living here for thousands of years.  Virtually everything changed: unfamiliar diseases like
smallpox ravished the population; the fur trade and European settlement and resource use
decimated the wildlife; new technology such as firearms altered Aboriginal economies and tribal
relations; Christian evangelism affected spiritual beliefs and values; European imposition of
4sovereignty and governmental structures weakened and, in some cases, replaced Aboriginal forms
of government; and so on.1  But more than anything else, the taking of Aboriginal lands by
Europeans has probably had the greatest long-term impact on the Aboriginal peoples.
In some areas of Canada, a degree of consent to this taking was obtained in the form of
treaties.2  Elsewhere--especially east of Ontario and in British Columbia--Aboriginal lands were
simply seized for incoming settlers.3  These discrepancies reveal both doubt (transparently self-
serving) among Europeans about whether the Aboriginal peoples had legal rights to their
traditional lands, and unevenness in the way Aboriginal land claims were actually dealt with.  But
from the beginning of European colonization, there was always some recognition of Aboriginal
use and occupation of land.  While French acknowledgment of this undeniable reality tended to be
revealed more in day-to-day relations with the Aboriginal peoples,4 Britain formally recognized
Aboriginal land rights in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.5  That document specifically reserved
unceded Aboriginal lands for Aboriginal occupation and use, and stipulated that those lands could
only be acquired by the Crown at an assembly of the Aboriginal people concerned.
While the Royal Proclamation provided a legal basis for the land surrender treaties that
followed, the issue of the nature of Aboriginal land rights remained unsettled.  Amazingly, that
issue was not judicially resolved until December 1997, when the Supreme Court of Canada finally
produced a legal definition of Aboriginal title in its landmark decision in Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia.6  That case involved claims by the Gitxsan (also spelled Gitksan) and Wet'suwet'en
Nations to ownership and jurisdiction over their traditional territories, encompassing 58,000
square kilometres--an area almost the size of New Brunswick--in northern British Columbia (see
the map of the claim area at page 8).7  The case resulted in one of the longest and most complex
5trials in Canadian history, taking 318 days for presentation of the evidence and a further 56 days
for legal argument.  The trial was conducted in the British Columbia Supreme Court before Chief
Justice McEachern, who produced a book-length judgment dismissing the claims.8  The British
Columbia Court of Appeal modified some aspects of that decision and affirmed others.9  On
further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada set aside the Court of Appeal's decision and ordered
a new trial.
Antonio Lamer, the Chief Justice of Canada, delivered the leading judgment.10  While
avoiding any decision on the merits of the case, he did outline some important principles to be
applied in Aboriginal title litigation.  First of all, he specified the title's content and explained how
it can be proved.  He then looked at the test for determining when a legislative infringement of
Aboriginal title can be justified.  Finally, he examined the issue of whether the provinces have
authority under the Constitution to extinguish Aboriginal title.  But even though self-government
was a vital part of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en claims, he refused to address that issue directly. 
However, there is some indication in his judgment that the Court might look favourably on a
claim of self-government in an appropriate future case.
In this lecture, I will examine the principles the Chief Justice laid down in relation to
Aboriginal title, and assess the possible impact of his decision on Aboriginal land claims and
resource development in Canada.  We will see that the decision has far-reaching implications that
could lead to the economic and political empowerment of Aboriginal peoples and to a radical
restructuring of Canadian federalism.
The Content of Aboriginal Title
6Prior to the Delgamuukw decision, judicial descriptions of Aboriginal title to land were vague.  In
1888, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council referred to it as "a personal and usufructuary
right,"11 but was unwilling to give a more precise definition.  In the Supreme Court of Canada in
1973, Justice Judson said it meant that, at the time of colonization, the Aboriginal peoples were
here, "organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries."12 
In 1984, Justice Dickson (later Chief Justice of Canada) said that it is "best characterized by its
general inalienability, coupled with the fact that the Crown is under an obligation to deal with the
land on the Indians' behalf when the interest is surrendered [to the Crown]."13  But the courts
were reluctant to say what Aboriginal title actually amounts to.  The question of whether
Aboriginal peoples are entitled to the forests, minerals, oil, and other resources on and under their
lands was left unresolved.
There were two sides to this debate over the content of Aboriginal title.  Non-Aboriginal
governments usually argued that it is limited to whatever uses Aboriginal peoples made of the
land prior to being influenced by Europeans.  In contrast to this, Aboriginal peoples generally
contended that they are entitled to make any use of their lands, including extraction of resources
like oil and minerals that were not utilized by them in the past.
Until the Delgamuukw decision, it was uncertain which way the Supreme Court of Canada
was going to come down on this issue.  At trial, the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en presented evidence
that they have occupied and used lands within the claimed territories for at least 3,500 years.  The
governments of British Columbia and Canada contended that the evidence presented was not
sufficient to establish Aboriginal title.  Moreover, even if it did establish title, the government
lawyers argued that the interest of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en in their lands is limited to uses
7that were integral to their distinctive cultures prior to contact with Europeans.14
The Supreme Court did not actually decide whether the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en have
Aboriginal title.  Chief Justice Lamer avoided a final determination of this issue because there
were discrepancies between the way the case had been pleaded and the way it was argued on
appeal.15  More importantly, he decided that McEachern C.J. had made errors at trial in his
treatment of the oral histories of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en.  Despite the fact that these
histories were vitally important to their case, McEachern C.J. refused to admit some of them and
did not attribute independent weight to those he was willing to admit.  Chief Justice Lamer said
that the courts have to be more appreciative of  "the evidentiary difficulties inherent in
adjudicating Aboriginal claims."16  Quoting from his own judgment in the Van der Peet case,
decided in 1996, he said that
a court should approach the rules of evidence, and interpret the evidence that
exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of Aboriginal claims, and of the
evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there
were no written records....17
As the trial judge failed to do that, his factual findings were unreliable and could not stand.  That
was the main reason why the Supreme Court ordered a new trial.
In my opinion, the most important aspect of the Delgamuukw decision for Aboriginal
peoples is the part dealing with the content of Aboriginal title.  For the first time, the Supreme
Court stopped avoiding this issue and provided a clear picture of the title's nature.  In so doing,
the Court rejected the position of British Columbia and Canada that Aboriginal title is limited to
historical uses of the land, but it also rejected the contention of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en that
it is equivalent to an inalienable fee simple estate.18  The Supreme Court affirmed earlier
8characterizations of Aboriginal title as sui generis; that is, as an interest in land that is in a class of
its own.19  The fact that Aboriginal title cannot be sold or transferred is one aspect of this
uniqueness.  Another is the title's collective nature--it can only be held by a community of
Aboriginal people, not by individuals.  The source of Aboriginal title also distinguishes it from
other land titles, which usually originate in Crown grants.  Because the Aboriginal peoples were
here before the Crown asserted sovereignty, their title is derived from the dual source of their
prior occupation and their pre-existing systems of law.
These sui generis aspects of Aboriginal title do not restrict the uses that Aboriginal
peoples can make of their lands.  Chief Justice Lamer proclaimed emphatically that Aboriginal title
is "a right to the land itself."20  It is not a mere collection of rights to pursue activities on the land
that were integral to the distinctive cultures of the Aboriginal peoples before Europeans appeared
on the scene, as British Columbia and Canada argued.  Instead, Aboriginal title encompasses a full
range of uses that need not be linked to past practices.  So Aboriginal nations can engage in
mining, lumbering, oil and gas extraction, and so on, even if they did not use their lands in those
ways in the past.21
But the Chief Justice did not stop there--he declared as well that the right Aboriginal
peoples have to use and occupy their lands is an exclusive right.  This means that Aboriginal
peoples are not just free to determine for themselves what uses they will make of their lands; they
also have as much right as any landholder to prevent others--and this includes governments--from
intruding on and using their lands without their consent.  Indeed, they should have even greater
protection against government intrusion than other landholders because their Aboriginal rights
have been recognized and affirmed by the Constitution,22 whereas the property rights of other
9landholders have not.  In my opinion the Supreme Court, while acknowledging the proprietary
nature and constitutional status of Aboriginal title, did not assign adequate significance to these
factors.  We will come back to this matter later, as it relates to another issue--namely,
infringement.
While describing Aboriginal title as a right of exclusive use and occupation of land, the
Supreme Court did place an inherent limitation on the purposes for which Aboriginal title lands
can be used.  The limitation is this:
Lands held pursuant to Aboriginal title cannot be used in a manner that is
irreconcilable with the nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis
of the group's claim to Aboriginal title.23
Chief Justice Lamer linked this limitation to the dual source of Aboriginal title in prior occupation
of land and pre-existing systems of Aboriginal law.  He emphasized the importance of maintaining
the continuity between the historic patterns of occupation which are the basis of Aboriginal title
and present-day uses.  Thus Aboriginal peoples cannot use their lands in ways that would prevent
their special relationship with the land from continuing into the future.  The Chief Justice gave
two examples to illustrate this point.  First, if the occupation necessary for establishing Aboriginal
title is proven by showing that the land was used as a hunting ground, it cannot be used today in
ways that would destroy its value for hunting--so strip mining, for instance, would be precluded. 
Secondly,
if a group claims a special bond with the land because of its ceremonial or cultural
significance, it may not use the land in such a way as to destroy that relationship
(e.g., by developing it in such a way that the bond is destroyed, perhaps by turning
it into a parking lot).24
These examples have added significance because they suggest that proof of a ceremonial or
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cultural connection with land, or of use of it as a hunting ground, can be sufficient to establish
Aboriginal title.  This relates to the matter of proof, to be discussed below.
To the extent that the inherent limitation on Aboriginal title precludes uses that would
destroy the value of the land for future generations, it probably accords with the understanding
Aboriginal people generally have of their own responsibilities.25  But the connection the Chief
Justice made between their historic relationship to the land and uses they can make of it today
concerns me because it suggests that Aboriginal peoples may be prisoners of the past.  Lamer C.J.
tried to dispel this kind of concern by emphasizing that the limitation does not restrict use to
activities traditionally carried out on the land.  "That," he said, "would amount to a legal
straitjacket on Aboriginal peoples who have a legitimate legal claim to the land."26  He added that
his approach "allows for a full range of uses of the land, subject only to an overarching limit,
defined by the special nature of the Aboriginal title in that land."27
But to what extent is the "special nature" of Aboriginal title tied to the past?  The Chief
Justice did not answer this question directly.  But if I understand him correctly, what he seems to
have had in mind is this: On the one hand, present uses are not limited to historic uses, but on the
other, present uses that would preclude historic uses, or destroy an Aboriginal people's special
relationship with the land, are not permitted.  In other words, present uses are not restricted to,
but they are restricted by, past practices and traditions.
So what if an Aboriginal society has changed so that its members no longer use their lands
as they once did--they now have a different relationship with the land, which is still special to
them, but is not historically based?  Are they still restricted by past practices and traditions that no
one is interested in following any more?  In that hypothetical situation, which Chief Justice Lamer
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does not seem to have considered, I would say no.  From a logical perspective, maintenance of
the restrictions would make little sense, though I suppose it would preserve the option of
returning to the abandoned practices and traditions in the future.  More disturbingly, isn't it
paternalistic for the Supreme Court to impose restrictions on Aboriginal title in the interests of
cultural preservation--which seems to be what this is all about--if the Aboriginal community in
question does not want them?  This brings me to the issue of self-government, which in my
opinion provides a way out of this dilemma.
Aboriginal Self-Government
As already mentioned, Chief Justice Lamer expressly avoided the issue of self-government, even
though it was a vital part of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en claims.  His reason for doing so was
that
the errors of fact made by the trial judge, and the resultant need for a new trial,
make it impossible for this Court to determine whether the claim to self-
government has been made out.28
The Chief Justice was not even willing to outline any general principles on self-government to
guide future litigation.  However, a careful reading of his decision reveals that, for theoretical and
practical reasons, self-government is essential for his conception of Aboriginal title to work.
We have seen that the Chief Justice said that pre-existing systems of Aboriginal law are a
source of Aboriginal title to land.  He therefore acknowledged that the Aboriginal peoples had
legal systems, which presupposes forms of government, prior to the arrival of Europeans in North
America.  Those legal systems and forms of government did not simply disappear when the
French and British Crowns proclaimed sovereignty over what is now Canada.  They continued to
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function in varying degrees,29 and regulated the internal affairs and external relations of the
Aboriginal nations.30  In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. acknowledged the existence of decision-
making authority in present-day Aboriginal communities, insofar as their land rights are
concerned.  After affirming that Aboriginal land is held communally by all the members of an
Aboriginal nation, he added that "[d]ecisions with respect to that land are also made by that
community."31  When one thinks about it, this decision-making authority has to accompany
communal land use rights, as how would resources be managed and distributed within the
community without it?  In the absence of community controls, there might be a free-for-all
scramble for resources--an Aboriginal version of the "tragedy of the commons."32  And decision-
making authority must entail a community structure for making decisions--in short, some form of
self-government.33
As suggested above, self-government provides a solution to the dilemma created by the
inherent limitation Chief Justice Lamer placed on Aboriginal title.  We have seen that this
limitation prevents Aboriginal lands from being used in ways that are inconsistent with an
Aboriginal nation's connection with the land.  But the nature of that connection must be allowed
to change over time so that Aboriginal peoples are not made prisoners of their own pasts. 
Canadian courts should not sit in judgment over social change in Aboriginal communities,
deciding what is and what is not necessary for their cultural preservation.34  That kind of
paternalism is self-defeating because it destroys the autonomy that is necessary for Aboriginal
communities to thrive as dynamic cultural and political entities.  Any internal limitations on
Aboriginal title in the interests of cultural preservation should be determined by Aboriginal nations
themselves through the exercise of self-government within their communities--they should not be
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imposed by Canadian courts.35
Proof of Aboriginal Title
In order to establish Aboriginal title, Chief Justice Lamer said that Aboriginal people must prove
that they occupied the claimed land at the time the Crown asserted sovereignty, and that the
occupation was exclusive.  The date of Crown assertion of sovereignty is the relevant time
because, in his words, "Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown's underlying title," and "it does
not make sense to speak of a burden on the underlying title before that title existed."36  Also, the
date of sovereignty is generally more certain than the date of first contact with Europeans, which
was the time the Court designated in Van der Peet for proof of other Aboriginal rights.37  The
Chief Justice distinguished Aboriginal title from other Aboriginal rights, such as a right to hunt or
fish, because Aboriginal title arises from occupation of land, whereas other Aboriginal rights do
not.  At common law, occupation of land, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish title.38
What then is required to prove occupation of land?  In the context of Aboriginal title,
Chief Justice Lamer said that both the common law and the Aboriginal perspective have to be
taken into account.  At common law, any acts in relation to land that indicate an intention to hold
it for one's own purposes are evidence of occupation.39  In assessing these acts, "the conditions of
life and the habits and ideas of the people" in question are relevant.40  Quoting from Professor
Brian Slattery, the Chief Justice said that, "[i]n considering whether occupation sufficient to
ground title is established, `one must take into account the group's size, manner of life, material
resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed.'"41  Regarding the
Aboriginal perspective, Lamer C.J. added that Aboriginal laws, including but not limited to land
14
tenure systems or land use laws, are also relevant to establishing occupation at the time the Crown
asserted sovereignty.  So while the issue to be determined is whether the lands were occupied at
that time, both physical presence and Aboriginal law can be used to prove it.
The Chief Justice acknowledged that "[c]onclusive evidence of pre-sovereignty
occupation may be difficult to come by."42  He said that evidence of present occupation could be
presented as proof of pre-sovereignty occupation.43  In that case there would have to be
continuity between the two, but this does not require "an unbroken chain of continuity," as long
as there has been "`substantial maintenance of the connection' between the people and the land."44 
Occupation, he said, "may have been disrupted for a time, perhaps as a result of the unwillingness
of European colonizers to recognize Aboriginal title."45  Hence disruptions in continuity,
especially when due to European violation of Aboriginal rights, do not preclude present-day
Aboriginal title.
As we have seen, for Aboriginal title to be established, the occupation at the time of
assertion of sovereignty must have been exclusive.  Chief Justice Lamer explained that, because
the right of use and occupation entailed by Aboriginal title is exclusive, the occupation necessary
to prove it must have been exclusive as well.  However, he observed that "[e]xclusivity is a
common law principle derived from the notion of fee simple ownership and should be imported
into the concept of Aboriginal title with caution."46  In this regard, the Aboriginal perspective
once again needs to be accorded as much weight as the common law perspective.  Also, joint
Aboriginal title can be shared by two or more Aboriginal nations by application of the concept of
shared exclusivity.  This would occur, for example, where "two Aboriginal nations lived on a
particular piece of land and recognized each other's entitlement to that land but nobody else's."47
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Infringement of Aboriginal Title
Although earlier decisions had intimated as much,48 Delgamuukw made clear that Aboriginal title
is a real property right--in Chief Justice Lamer's words, it is "the right to the land itself."49  We
have seen that it is also an exclusive right, which means that Aboriginal titleholders can keep
others from intruding on their lands.50  As a result, any such intrusion, unless authorized by law,
would be an actionable trespass.  Stated more broadly, as a property right Aboriginal title is
entitled to as much legal protection as any other property right in Canada.
But Aboriginal title is not just a property right--it is also a constitutionally protected right. 
Because it is recognized and affirmed as an Aboriginal right by section 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982,51 it is accorded protection against government interference that no other property
rights in Canada enjoy.  However, this protection, like the protection accorded to fundamental
rights by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is not absolute.  In R. v. Sparrow,52 decided in
1990, the Supreme Court held that Aboriginal rights can be infringed by federal legislation that
meets a strict test of justification.  This test requires the government to prove that there is a valid
legislative objective behind the infringement, and that the fiduciary duty the Crown owes to the
Aboriginal peoples has been respected.  In Sparrow, the Court said that the legislative objective
must be "compelling and substantial," and that respect for the fiduciary duty means that
Aboriginal rights must be given priority over non-Aboriginal interests.53  This priority is in
keeping with the constitutional status of Aboriginal rights, which, to borrow a metaphor from
Ronald Dworkin, allows them to "trump" other rights that are not constitutionally protected.54 
The Court also stated that, in some circumstances, consultation with the Aboriginal people whose
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rights are involved will have to take place before measures infringing the rights are adopted.55
However, in decisions since Sparrow the Supreme Court has watered down the protection
accorded to Aboriginal rights to such an extent that, in my opinion, their constitutional status has
been seriously undermined.  It seemed clear from Sparrow that Aboriginal rights can only be
overridden in exceptional circumstances, as one would expect where constitutional rights are
concerned, and then only by means of or pursuant to legislation.56  In that case, the Aboriginal
right in question was a right to fish for food, societal and ceremonial purposes.  The Court
decided that federal regulations could limit this right if necessary for the valid legislative purpose
of conserving fish stocks.  In other words, infringement would be justified if the government had
no other viable options for conserving this vital resource.  The government could not, however,
justify an infringement of the right just because that would be in the "public interest."  Chief
Justice Dickson and Justice La Forest, delivering the unanimous judgment, put it this way:
We find the “public interest” justification to be so vague as to provide no
meaningful guidance and so broad as to be unworkable as a test for the
justification of a limitation on constitutional rights.57
However, when the Court revisited this issue six years later in the Gladstone case, it did
endorse public interest justifications, though not quite in the broad terms rejected in Sparrow. 
Delivering the majority judgment, Chief Justice Lamer said that, because
Aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader social, political and
economic community, over which the Crown is sovereign, there are circumstances
in which, in order to pursue objectives of compelling and substantial importance to
that community as a whole (taking into account the fact that Aboriginal societies
are a part of that community), some limitation of those rights will be justifiable.58
Taken by itself, this passage does not suggest that public interest alone is a sufficient justification
for overriding Aboriginal rights, but when one looks at the kinds of objectives that Lamer C.J.
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was willing to characterize as compelling and substantial, that seems to be the result.
To give this some context, we need to be aware that Gladstone involved a commercial
Aboriginal fishing right, specifically a right to sell herring spawn on kelp in large quantities.  This
distinguished it from Sparrow, which involved an Aboriginal right to fish mainly for food.  In
Gladstone, Lamer C.J. decided that a commercial Aboriginal fishing right does not have complete
priority over other fishing.59  So after necessary conservation has been provided for, how is the
fish resource to be allocated among the various users?  The Chief Justice said that, while
commercial fishing pursuant to an Aboriginal right still has to be given some priority, government
allocation of the resource can take into account
objectives such as the pursuit of economic and regional fairness, and the
recognition of the historic reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by non-
Aboriginal groups.60
What he seems to be suggesting here is that, in the interests of  "economic and regional fairness,"
the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal peoples can be infringed by legislation for the purpose
of distributing some of the resource to others.  Since when, I would like to know, can
constitutional rights be overridden for the economic benefit of private persons who do not have
equivalent rights?  Isn't this turning the Constitution on its head by allowing interests that are not
constitutional to trump rights that are?61
Justice McLachlin recognized these problems in her forceful dissent in Van der Peet,
where she discussed Chief Justice Lamer's judgment in Gladstone.  For one thing, she found his
approach to be inconsistent with Sparrow because it extended the meaning of "compelling and
substantial," in her words, "to any goal which can be justified for the good of the community as a
whole, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal."62  She continued:
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The extension of the concept of compelling objective to matters like economic and
regional fairness and the interests of non-Aboriginal fishers ... would negate the
very Aboriginal right to fish itself, on the ground that this is required for the
reconciliation of Aboriginal rights and other interests and the consequent good of
the community as a whole.63
For her, this would permit the Crown to "convey a portion of an Aboriginal fishing right to
others, not by treaty or with the consent of the Aboriginal people, but by its own unilateral act."64 
She found this to be not only unacceptable, but also unconstitutional.65  I agree.
Chief Justice Lamer appears to have been oblivious to these objections, as he relied
heavily on Gladstone in his discussion of infringement in Delgamuukw.  From Sparrow and
Gladstone he extracted general principles governing justification for infringement of Aboriginal
rights, which he then applied to Aboriginal title.  In particular, he pointed out that most of the
legislative objectives that may justify infringement "can be traced to the reconciliation of the prior
occupation of North America by Aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty."66 
He added that reconciliation "entails the recognition that ‘distinctive Aboriginal societies exist
within, and are a part of, a broader social, political and economic community.’"67  He then made a
remarkable statement that reveals how little the constitutional protection of Aboriginal title really
means:
In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric
power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia,
protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure
and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of
objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the
infringement of Aboriginal title.68
Let us be clear about what the Chief Justice had in mind here.  If the government thinks
the development of agriculture is sufficiently important, it can settle "foreign populations" (by
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which he must have meant non-Aboriginal Canadians) on Aboriginal lands, even though that
would be a clear infringement of Aboriginal title.  In other words, replacement of Aboriginal
peoples who do not farm with Canadians who do can be justifiable, even though this is an
infringement of the Aboriginal peoples' constitutional rights.  This sounds very much like a
familiar justification for dispossessing Aboriginal peoples in the heyday of European colonialism in
eastern North America-- agriculturalists are superior to hunters and gatherers, and so can take
their lands.69  But Lamer C.J. was not referring to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries--he
was talking about the present day, as justification for infringement only became relevant after
Aboriginal rights were constitutionalized in 1982!
Development of forestry and mining are two more examples Lamer C.J. gave of objectives
that would justify infringing Aboriginal title.  Now we all know who, for the most part, engages in
these kinds of resource development today--large, usually multinational, corporations.  So what
the Chief Justice appears to have envisaged here is government-authorized intrusion onto
Aboriginal lands to serve the economic interests of large corporations.  If this is justifiable for the
good of the community as a whole, then Lamer C.J. seems to subscribe to the view that what is
good for large corporations is good for Canada, and if it is good for Canada, then Aboriginal
rights can be brushed aside.
To put this in context, we need to think about how private, non-Aboriginal lands are
treated by governments in Canada.  Has anyone ever heard of someone's ranch or resort land
being taken by the government and transferred to someone else because it would be economically
beneficial to the community for the land to be farmed?  If a private landowner decides not to
develop his or her land, is it justifiable for the government to take it away and grant it to a
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corporation because it contains valuable timber or minerals?  Of course not.  Governments can
only expropriate land for public purposes, such as highways and airports, and then only if they
have clear statutory authority to do so.70  They have no power to take someone's land and grant it
to someone else, even if that might be good for the community.71  Protection of private property
from this kind of interference happens to be a fundamental tenet of our English law system, and
has been ever since Magna Carta.72
But from what Lamer C.J. said about infringement and justification in Delgamuukw, it
sounds like Aboriginal title lands are more vulnerable to government interference than private
lands.  How can this be?  We have seen that Aboriginal title is constitutionally protected in
Canada, whereas private property rights are not.  The whole purpose of constitutionalizing rights
is to place them beyond government infringement, except in exceptional circumstances.  In 1982,
a conscious choice was made to provide that protection to Aboriginal rights but not to private
property rights.  So how is it that Aboriginal rights have now become more vulnerable?  With
respect, for me this aspect of Lamer C.J.'s judgment is simply perverse.
There are, however, a couple of qualifiers in the part of Lamer C.J.'s judgment on
infringement that may serve as checks on the broad governmental power over Aboriginal title that
he apparently endorsed.  First, following Sparrow,73 he held that one consequence of the Crown's
fiduciary duty is that Aboriginal peoples must be consulted before infringements of their
Aboriginal title will be justifiable.74  This requirement of consultation would result in "the
involvement of Aboriginal peoples in decisions taken with respect to their lands."75  The extent of
the requisite involvement apparently depends on the severity of the infringement.  Lamer C.J. put
it this way:
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The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with the circumstances. 
In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or relatively minor, it will be no
more than a duty to discuss important decisions that will be taken with respect to
lands held pursuant to Aboriginal title.  Of course, even in these rare cases when
the minimum acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good
faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of the
Aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue.  In most cases, it will be significantly
deeper than mere consultation.  Some cases may even require the full consent of an
Aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing
regulations in relation to Aboriginal lands.76
His suggestion that mere consultation would not fulfil the Crown's fiduciary duty in most cases,
and that full Aboriginal consent would be necessary in some situations, does allow for significant
Aboriginal participation in decision-making regarding their lands, and for a veto power where the
infringement of their Aboriginal title is sufficiently serious.
The other qualifier that could act as a practical deterrent to infringement is what Lamer
C.J. called the "economic aspect" of Aboriginal title.77  As we have seen, he held that Aboriginal
title entails a right to exclusive use and occupation, encompassing resources both on and under
the land, including timber and minerals.78  After saying that the economic aspect is particularly
relevant "when one takes into account the modern uses to which lands held pursuant to Aboriginal
title can be put," he continued:
The economic aspect of Aboriginal title suggests that compensation is relevant to
the question of justification as well, a possibility suggested in Sparrow and which I
repeated in Gladstone.  Indeed, compensation for breaches of fiduciary duty are a
well-established part of the landscape of Aboriginal rights: Guerin.  In keeping
with the duty of honour and good faith on the Crown, fair compensation will
ordinarily be required when Aboriginal title is infringed.  The amount of
compensation payable will vary with the nature of the particular Aboriginal title
affected and with the nature and severity of the infringement and the extent to
which Aboriginal interests were accommodated.79
Infringement of Aboriginal title is not without cost.  Aboriginal peoples have a right to
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compensation for any loss they incur as a result of infringement.  Moreover, as Lamer C.J. linked
this right to the fiduciary duty which is integral to the constitutional status of Aboriginal title, it
would seem that the obligation to pay compensation is constitutional.80  This means that it cannot
be avoided by legislation.81  Given that Aboriginal title includes natural resources, any
infringement of it for the purpose of developing those resources could result in expensive
compensation payments.  When one combines this right to compensation with the duty to consult,
what emerges from the part of Lamer C.J.'s judgment on infringement is an emphasis on
Aboriginal participation in resource development.82
Throughout his discussion of infringement, Lamer C.J. seems to have taken for granted
that provincial legislatures as well as the federal Parliament can infringe Aboriginal title, provided
they are able to meet the justification test.83  But as we are about to see, this appears to be in
direct conflict with another part of his judgment, dealing with Aboriginal title and federalism.
Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction over Aboriginal Title
Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867,84 divided governmental powers between the
Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures.  Section 91(24) assigned exclusive
jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians," to Parliament.  The Delgamuukw
decision resolved a long-standing debate over whether the words "Lands reserved for the Indians"
include lands held by Aboriginal title.85  Chief Justice Lamer decided, on the basis of his
interpretation of earlier authority and for public policy reasons,86 that Aboriginal title lands are
included under that constitutional head of power.
Then what are the implications of this?  The Chief Justice said explicitly that this means
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that the provinces, since Confederation, have been unable to extinguish Aboriginal title.  But as
mentioned previously, he nonetheless suggested that the provinces can infringe Aboriginal title,
provided they justify the infringement by meeting the Sparrow and Gladstone test.87  This is also
apparent from his examples of infringement for the purposes of agriculture, forestry, and mining,
all of which come primarily under provincial jurisdiction.  But how, one might ask, can the
provinces infringe Aboriginal title for any of these purposes if it is under exclusive federal
jurisdiction?
Surprisingly, Chief Justice Lamer did not even mention, let alone answer, this question.  I
nonetheless think that the correct response is that they cannot.  This response is based on the
constitutional principle of interjurisdictional immunity, which prevents the provinces from
enacting legislation in relation to matters that are under exclusive federal jurisdiction.88  In
Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. accepted the application of this principle to Aboriginal title, given that it
is a federal matter.89  So to the extent that provincial laws are in relation to land, they cannot
apply to "Lands reserved for the Indians," including Aboriginal title lands.
There is an extensive, well-settled body of case law excluding the application of provincial
laws to one category of these section 91(24) lands, namely, Indian reserves.  Every case I am
aware of on this issue--and this includes Supreme Court of Canada decisions--has held that, to the
extent that provincial laws relate to use and possession of lands, they cannot apply to reserve
lands.90  This case law clearly applies to Aboriginal title lands, as Lamer C.J., in Delgamuukw,
specifically adopted an earlier judicial statement that the interest in reserve and Aboriginal title
lands is the same.91  In both instances, the Aboriginal interest entails a right to exclusive use and
occupation.  The reason why provincial laws relating to use and occupation cannot apply on
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reserves is precisely because those laws would interfere with that Aboriginal interest.  If this is the
case for reserve lands, it must be the case for Aboriginal title lands as well.92
How then was Chief Justice Lamer able to conclude that provincial laws can infringe
Aboriginal title, particularly if the infringement involved something as intrusive as engaging in
agriculture, forestry, or mining on Aboriginal lands?  It is perfectly obvious that activities like
these would interfere with the Aboriginal titleholders' right of exclusive use and occupation. 
Frankly, I do not have an answer to this.  It appears to be an oversight, a case of the left hand
having forgotten what the right hand has done.  The Supreme Court will have to return to this
issue in the future, and resolve this glaring contradiction.
So how might the Court resolve this?93  In my opinion, it will be virtually impossible for
the Court to backtrack on its conclusion that Aboriginal title comes under exclusive federal
jurisdiction.  As its motivation for doing so would obviously be to rescue provincial power to
infringe Aboriginal title, it would leave itself wide open to attack for changing its mind for
political and economic reasons, at the expense of legal principle and to the detriment of Aboriginal
rights.  That would not engender respect for the Court by Aboriginal peoples, nor, I would
expect, by other fair-minded Canadians.  Instead, I think the Court will be obliged to accept the
consequences of its decision that Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over Aboriginal title.  This
means that, to the extent that infringements of Aboriginal title can be justified--and we have seen




Has the Supreme Court finally got the definition of Aboriginal title right?  My answer, as is
probably obvious by now, is an equivocal lawyer's response--yes and no.  On the yes side, with
some reservations I think the Court's approach to the issues of proof and content of Aboriginal
title is basically correct.94  What Aboriginal people have to show is exclusive occupation of land at
the time the Crown asserted sovereignty.  Occupation here is evaluated by reference to their own
societies and their own ways of using the land, not by European standards.  Joint occupation by
more than one Aboriginal nation is also recognized.  On content of Aboriginal title, the Court has
acknowledged that it is a right to exclusive use and occupation, for a full range of purposes that
are not limited to historic uses.  This is in keeping with common law principles, which have never
limited the uses an occupant can make of land to the uses relied upon to establish the
occupation.95  The inherent limitation excluding uses that are irreconcilable with the nature of the
particular Aboriginal people's attachment to the land may be problematic, but as we have seen this
will depend on whether the Court allows for modifications to the nature of that attachment over
time, through cultural change and the exercise of powers of self-government.
However, in its treatment of the issue of infringement of Aboriginal title, I think the
Supreme Court made serious errors.  The suggestion that Aboriginal title can be infringed in the
interests of economic development, benefiting private persons and corporations, disregards the
special protection accorded to property rights by English law for close to eight hundred years. 
Moreover, Aboriginal title, unlike other property rights, is also protected against government
interference by the Canadian Constitution, a fact that was acknowledged but not given sufficient
importance by the Court.
Finally, there are the matters of provincial infringement of Aboriginal title and the
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constitutional division of powers.  As we have seen, Chief Justice Lamer's inference that
provincial legislatures can infringe Aboriginal title is in stark contradiction to his ruling that
Aboriginal title is under the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament.  I have no doubt that the Court
will have to take a second look at this issue, and I hope this contradiction will be resolved in a
way that respects both constitutional principles and Aboriginal rights.
Overall, there can be no doubt that Delgamuukw is a landmark decision.  As the full
impact of it sinks in, it will have a dramatic effect, especially in areas of Canada where land
cession treaties or land claims agreements have not yet been signed.  By specifying that
"Aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant
to that title for a variety of purposes,"96 it helps to level the playing field between Aboriginal
peoples and non-Aboriginal governments in the negotiation of land claims.97  It could also alter
the nature of those negotiations very significantly.  In the land claims agreements that have been
signed since the federal government instituted a land claims policy in 1973,98 the Aboriginal
parties have generally been obliged to surrender their Aboriginal title to the entire land claim area,
in return for security of tenure in the form of recognized title to a portion of it, and other
benefits.99  At the time they were signed, these agreements may have been reasonable
compromises, given the uncertainty over the meaning of Aboriginal title.  That uncertainty no
longer exists.  Given that the Supreme Court has finally accepted that Aboriginal title is the right
to exclusive use and occupation, and includes natural resources, why should Aboriginal people be
willing to surrender Aboriginal title to any of their Aboriginal lands?  As a result of Delgamuukw,
they already have the security of tenure and entitlement to natural resources that they sought in
earlier agreements.
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Then why negotiate land claims agreements at all?  In my opinion, there are two reasons
for doing so.  First of all, after Delgamuukw Aboriginal people still have to prove that they have
Aboriginal title.100  While the decision did remove the uncertainty over the meaning of Aboriginal
title, it did not resolve the issue of which Aboriginal peoples have title to what lands.  The
decision did not even resolve that matter for the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en--that is why the case
was sent back to trial.  To avoid the protracted, expensive litigation that would be required to
establish Aboriginal title in court, it is advisable for Aboriginal peoples to try to resolve the issues
of the existence and geographical extent of their Aboriginal title through negotiations with the
federal and provincial governments.101  If those governments refuse to take sufficient account of
the Delgamuukw decision in the negotiations, or display other instances of bad faith, then the
Aboriginal peoples always have the option of going to court.
A second reason for negotiating is that, although Aboriginal peoples are entitled to the
resources on and under their lands, the inalienability of Aboriginal title102 may prevent them from
developing those resources without the cooperation of the federal government.  This feature of
Aboriginal title may, for example, prevent Aboriginal titleholders from entering into leaseholds or
resource extraction agreements with corporations that have the expertise and capital to develop
the resources.  While there would appear to be no legal impediment preventing Aboriginal peoples
from developing these resources on their own (as long as they do not violate the inherent
limitation on their title,103) this may not be a realistic option, at least in the short term, for
Aboriginal peoples who do not have the necessary human and financial resources.  So for
Aboriginal peoples who are interested in developing the resources on their lands, negotiation of
agreements with the federal and provincial governments may be unavoidable.
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In the meantime we have seen that, given exclusive federal jurisdiction over Aboriginal
rights, the provinces should not be able to infringe Aboriginal title.  Without Aboriginal consent,
provincially authorized resource development on lands subject to Aboriginal claims therefore
poses substantial risks.  If Aboriginal title to those lands is subsequently established, the province
and the developer could be liable for damages for trespass.104  In circumstances where the
province and the developer had prior notice of those claims, punitive damages as well as damages
for actual loss might be appropriate, especially where disruption to Aboriginal ways of life has
occurred that cannot be repaired and cannot be assessed in monetary terms.  As those damages
might far outweigh the benefits of the trespass, provincial governments and developers should
think twice before engaging in resource development or other use of lands that are subject to
Aboriginal claims.
Acting under the authority conferred on it by section 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867, we have seen that the Parliament of Canada can infringe Aboriginal title as long as the
infringement can be justified.  On the basis of the Delgamuukw decision, it would therefore seem
that Parliament could authorize resource development on Aboriginal title lands.105  But for that to
be justified, at the very least there would have to be consultation with the Aboriginal titleholders,
and in some instances their consent would have to be obtained.  Moreover, compensation would
have to be paid to them for any violation of their Aboriginal title.  If the benefit of the
infringement went to a province or to a resource developer, what incentive would there be for the
federal government to incur the cost of paying compensation?106  From a practical perspective, the
more viable alternative would be for agreements to be negotiated with the Aboriginal peoples for
resource development on their lands.  For these agreements to be valid, the federal government
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would have to be a party.  But where the lands are located within provincial boundaries, the
province would need to be involved as well.107
Negotiated agreements are the means by which Aboriginal land claims have been dealt
with in Canada historically, originally by treaties and more recently by land claims agreements. 
This approach respects the Aboriginal peoples and their authority to make decisions regarding
their lands, whereas non-consensual infringement of their Aboriginal title by federal legislation
does not.  Legislative infringement is a coercive act that should only be used in emergencies or as
a last resort where a compelling and substantial objective is at stake, and the Aboriginal
titleholders refuse good-faith negotiations.  Moreover, there is no valid reason why negotiations
need result in an absolute surrender of Aboriginal title.108  Aboriginal people should be able to
participate in negotiations for the development of their lands without being compelled to give up
their title.109
Despite its shortcomings, the Delgamuukw decision could usher in a new era for
Aboriginal rights in Canada.  For the first time, the right of Aboriginal peoples to participate as
equal partners in resource development on Aboriginal lands has been acknowledged.  But for this
new partnership to work, the federal and provincial governments will have to shed out-dated
attitudes and accept the new legal landscape.110  This will take political courage, leadership, and
imagination.  The Canadian public as well needs to be aware of the unique position of the
Aboriginal peoples in Canadian society, and accept the fact that they have special rights as the
original inhabitants of this country.  Over and over in his recent decisions on Aboriginal rights,
Chief Justice Lamer has emphasized the need for reconciliation.  Public support for governments
that have the vision to negotiate just agreements with Aboriginal peoples for a sharing of this
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Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 64 Canadian Bar Review 727, at 758.
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42. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 72 (para. 152).
43. This is in keeping with common law principles, whereby proof of present occupation raises
a rebuttable presumption of title: see Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of
England; or a Commentary upon Littleton, 19th ed., edited by Charles Butler (London: J. & W.T.
Clarke et al., 1832), 239a, Butler's n.1; William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,
21st ed. (London: Sweet, Maxwell and Stevens & Norton, 1844), vol. 2, 196, vol. 3, 177, 180; Kent
McNeil, "A Question of Title: Has the Common Law Been Misapplied to Dispossess the
Aboriginals?" (1990) 16 Monash University Law Review 91, esp. 104, 107-110; Common Law
Aboriginal Title, supra note 35, esp. 42-49, 218-20, 277-79, 298; Calder, supra note 12, per Hall
J. (dissenting on other grounds) at 375.  However, the authorities go further than Lamer C.J., as
adverse claimants generally have to show a better title in themselves to rebut the presumption arising
from present occupation: e.g., see Roe d. Haldane and Urry v. Harvey (1769), 4 Burr. 2484 (K.B.),
at 2487-88; Goodtitle d. Parker v. Baldwin (1809), 11 East 488 (K.B.), at 495; Danford v. McAnulty
(1883), 8 App. Cas. 456 (H.L.), at 460-62, 464-65.  Put another way, as against those who cannot
show a better right themselves, occupation is a sufficient title: see Asher v. Whitlock (1865), L.R. 1
Q.B. 1 (Q.B.); Mussammat Sundar v. Mussammat Parbati (1889), L.R. 16 I.A. 186 (P.C.), at 193.
Moreover, these principles apply against the Crown as well as against other adverse claimants: see
Bristow v. Cormican (1878), 3 App. Cas. 641 (H.L.); Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, [1901] A.C. 561
(P.C.), at 576; Perry v. Clissold, [1907] A.C. 73 (P.C.).  So if an Aboriginal people is in present
occupation of land, the burden should be on the Crown to rebut the presumption of title by showing
that the lands were vacant at the time the Crown acquired sovereignty.  See also infra note 100.
44. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 72-73 (para. 153), citing Van der Peet, supra note 14, at 206
(para. 65), and Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 (Aust. H.C.).
45. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 72 (para. 153).  On this unwillingness in British Columbia, see
generally Fisher, supra note 1; Tennant, supra note 3; Hamar Foster, "Letting Go the Bone: The Idea
of Indian Title in British Columbia," in Hamar Foster and John McLaren, eds., Essays in the History
of Canadian Law, vol. VI, British Columbia and the Yukon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press
and the Osgoode Society, 1995), 28.  Where Aboriginal peoples were wrongfully dispossessed, they
should be able to rely on their occupation at the time to establish their title: see generally Common
Law Aboriginal Title, 15-78.
46. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 73 (para. 156).
47. Ibid., at 74 (para. 158).
48. See esp. Canadian Pacific, supra note 19, at 677.  For discussion, see "Meaning of
Aboriginal Title," supra note 21, at 142-43.
49. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 67 (para. 138).
50. Ibid., at 73 (para. 155).
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51. See supra note 22.
52. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (hereinafter Sparrow).
53. Ibid., at 1113, 1114-16.  See also R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 65 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter
Gladstone), at 88-101 (para. 54-84); R. v. Adams, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (S.C.C.), at 22-23 (para. 56-
59); R. v. Côté, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 26 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter Côté), at 58-59 (para. 81-83).
54. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977).  Interestingly,
in Sparrow, supra note 52, at 1119, the Court echoed the title of Dworkin's book, without mentioning
it, in a passage stating that the objective of the requirement of priority is to guarantee that
government conservation and management of resources (in that case salmon stocks) "treat
[A]boriginal peoples in a way ensuring that their rights are taken seriously."
55. Sparrow, supra note 52, at 187.
56. Legislation would be necessary because a fundamental principle of the rule of law prevents
legal rights, and especially rights of property, from being infringed by executive action in the absence
of unequivocal statutory authority: see Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 St. Tr. 1029 (C.P.); Attorney-
General for Canada v. Hallet & Carey Ld, [1952] A.C. 427 (P.C.); Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959]
S.C.R. 121.  For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, "Racial Discrimination and Unilateral
Extinguishment of Native Title" (1996) 1 Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 181 (hereinafter
"Racial Discrimination"), esp. 182-90.  The constitutionalization of Aboriginal title means that, in
addition, the legislative authorization must meet the Sparrow test of justification.
57. Sparrow, supra note 52, at 1113.
58. Gladstone, supra note 53, at 97 (para. 73) (my emphasis).
59. He distinguished Sparrow, which did give complete priority to Aboriginal food fishing,
because fishing for that purpose contains an internal limitation (an Aboriginal nation can only
consume so much fish), whereas commercial fishing is limited only by "the market and the availability
of the resource": ibid., at 90 (para. 57).
60. Ibid., at 98 (para. 75).
61. For more detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil, "How Can Infringements of the Constitutional
Rights of Aboriginal Peoples Be Justified?" (1997) 8:2 Constitutional Forum 33.
62. Van der Peet, supra note 14, at 278 (para. 304).
63. Ibid., at 279 (para. 306).
64. Ibid., at 283 (para. 315).
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65. Ibid., at 283 (para. 314).  She also described the Chief Justice's approach to justification as
"indeterminate and ultimately more political than legal," and "contrary to the intention of the framers
of the constitution": ibid., at 278 (para. 302), 281 (para. 308).
66. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 78 (para. 165) (Lamer C.J.'s emphasis).
67. Ibid., quoting from Gladstone, supra note 53, at 97 (para. 73).
68. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 78 (para. 165).
69. See Wilcomb E. Washburn, "The Moral and Legal Justifications for Dispossessing the
Indians," in James Morton Smith, ed., Seventeenth Century America: Essays in Colonial History
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 15; Geoffrey S. Lester, "Primitivism versus
Civilization: A Basic Question in the Law of Aboriginal Rights to Land," in Carol Brice-Bennett, ed.,
Our Footprints Are Everywhere: Inuit Land Use and Occupancy in Labrador (Ottawa: Labrador
Inuit Association, 1977), 351; Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal
Thought: Discourses of Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), esp. 246-49. 
70. This power of expropriation did not exist at common law, other than in exceptional
circumstances where necessary for defence: see Blackstone, supra note 43, vol. 1, 139; Keith Davies,
Law of Compulsory Purchase and Compensation, 3rd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1978), 9-10;
Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.) (hereinafter De Keyser's Royal
Hotel); Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75 (H.L.).
71. For detailed discussion, see "Racial Discrimination," supra note 56.
72. Magna Carta, 17 John (1215), c.29, provided that "[n]o Freeman shall ... be disseised of his
Freehold ... but by the lawful Judgement of his Peers, or by the law of the Land."  As Lord Parmoor
stated in De Keyser's Royal Hotel, supra note 70, at 569, "[s]ince Magna Carta the estate of a subject
in lands or buildings has been protected against the prerogative of the Crown."  For affirmation of
the fundamental nature of property rights in English law, see Blackstone, supra note 43, vol. 1, at
127-29, 138-40; Herbert Broom, Constitutional Law Viewed in Relation to Common Law, 2nd ed.
by George L. Denman (London: W. Maxwell and Son, 1885), 225-45; Halsbury's Laws of England,
4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1973-86), vol. 8 (1974), para. 833; James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian
of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 13-14, 54-55.
73. See text accompanying note 55, supra.  Lamer C.J. also referred to Guerin, supra note 13,
in this context.
74. "There is always a duty of consultation": Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 79 (para. 168).  I am
grateful to Professor Peter Russell for bringing this vital point to my attention.
75. Ibid. For a post-Delgamuukw decision requiring such involvement before lumbering
operations are conducted on land claimed under Aboriginal title, see Kitkatla Band v. British
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Columbia (Minister of Forests), [1998] B.C.J. no. 1460 (Quicklaw) (B.C.S.C.) 
76. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 79 (para. 168).
77. Ibid., at 79 (para. 169).
78. See text accompanying notes 20-21, supra.
79. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 79-80 (para. 169).
80. In this respect, the protection accorded to Aboriginal title by s.35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982 (see supra note 22) resembles the protection accorded to private property by the taking
provision of the Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution ("nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation") and by s.51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution
(empowering the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to the "acquisition of
property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament
has power to make laws").
81. In contrast to this, the obligation to pay compensation for the taking of property that is not
constitutionally protected is subject to legislative override, as long as the denial of compensation is
clearly expressed: see Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) v. Cannon Brewery Co., Ltd., [1919]
A.C. 744 (H.L.), per Lord Atkinson at 752.
82. Lamer C.J. said the requirement, arising out of the fiduciary duty, that the prior interest of
Aboriginal titleholders be reflected in the distribution of resources, "might entail [among other things]
that governments accommodate the participation of Aboriginal peoples in the development of the
resources of British Columbia": Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 78-79 (para. 167).
83. E.g., see the last sentence of the quotation accompanying note 76, supra.
84. 30 & 31 Vict. (U.K.), c.3.
85. See Robert D. J. Pugh, "Are Northern Lands Reserved for the Indians?" (1982) 60 Canadian
Bar Review 36; Hamar Foster, "Roadblocks and Legal History, Part II: Aboriginal Title and s.91(24)"
(1996) 54 The Advocate 531.
86. The case relied on was St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 11.  Lamer C.J. also said that if
Parliament does not have exclusive jurisdiction over Aboriginal title, the result would be "most
unfortunate," as "the government vested with primary constitutional responsibility for securing the
welfare of Canada's Aboriginal peoples would find itself unable to safeguard one of the most central
of Native interests--their interest in their lands": Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 83 (para. 176).
87. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 75 (para. 160).  Lamer C.J. relied on his own judgment in Côté,
supra note 53, to reach this conclusion.  However, it can be argued that Côté was wrong in this
respect because it misapplied R. v. Badger, [1996] 2 C.N.L.R. 77 (S.C.C.): see Kent McNeil,
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"Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction"
(hereinafter "Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction"), (1998), 61 Saskatchewan Law Review
95 (hereinafter “Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction.”   See also Albert C. Peeling,
"Provincial Jurisdiction After Delgamuukw," paper delivered at  Continuing Legal Education Society
of British Columbia Conference, Vancouver, March 25, 1998), at 2.1.03, where it is pointed out that
the provincial law in question in Côté, while it may have had an incidental effect on an Aboriginal
right, did not infringe it.
88. While provincial laws of general application might have a valid incidental effect on Aboriginal
title, to the extent that they actually infringe it they would cross the line into exclusive federal
jurisdiction and so offend the principle of interjurisdictional immunity: see Peeling, supra note 87, at
2.1.02-03.
89. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 83 (para. 177-78).
90. E.g., see Corporation of Surrey v. Peace Arch (1970), 74 W.W.R. 380 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Isaac (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 (N.S.S.C., App. Div.) (hereinafter Isaac); Derrickson v.
Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285 (hereinafter Derrickson); Paul v. Paul, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 306.  Cases
that have found provincial laws to be applicable on reserves have done so by characterizing those
laws as laws in relation to something other than use and possession of land: e.g., see Four B
Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031 (labour laws);
R. v. Francis, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (traffic laws); R. v. Fiddler, [1994] 1 C.N.L.R. 121 (Sask. Q.B.)
(hereinafter Fiddler) (fire safety); Brantford (Township) v. Doctor, [1996] 1 C.N.L.R. 49 (Ont. Gen.
Div.) (health and safety).  Western Industrial Contractors Ltd. v. Sarcee Developments Ltd. (1979),
98 D.L.R. (3d) 424 (Alta. S.C., App. Div.), might appear to be an exception, but really it is not
because there the Court decided that a leasehold held by a non-Indian on a reserve is not land
"reserved for the Indians."  For further discussion of these and other relevant cases, see "Rethinking
Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction," supra note 87.
91. Guerin, supra note 13, at 379, cited in Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 60 (para. 120).  For
further discussion, see "Meaning of Aboriginal Title," supra note 21, at 148-51.
92. For further discussion, see "Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction," supra note 87.
93. Referential incorporation of provincial laws in relation to land into federal law might provide
a legislative solution, but according to the case law this has not been not done by s.88 of the Indian
Act, supra note 29, because it only makes provincial laws of general application apply to "Indians,"
not to "Lands reserved for the Indians": see R. v. Johns (1962), 133 C.C.C. 43 (Sask. C.A.), at 47;
Isaac, supra note 90, at 474; Re Park Mobile Homes Sales Ltd. and Le Greely (1978), 85 D.L.R.
(3d) 618 (B.C.C.A.), at 619; Millbrook Indian Band v. Northern Counties Residential Tenancies
Board (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 174 (N.S.S.C.), at 181-83, affirmed without reference to s.88, sub
nom. Attorney-General of Nova Scotia v. Millbrook Indian Band (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 230
(N.S.S.C., App. Div.); Palm Dairies Ltd. v. The Queen, [1979] 2 C.N.L.R. 43 (F.C.T.D.), at 48; The
Queen v. Smith, [1980] 4 C.N.L.R. 29 (F.C.A.), at 78, reversed on other grounds, without reference
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to s.88, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 554; Fiddler, supra note 90, at 127-28.  Although the Supreme Court
explicitly avoided this question in Derrickson, supra note 90, at 297-99, it is unlikely that the Court
would overrule the above decisions on this point, three of which were made by provincial courts of
appeal, and most of which are long-standing.  For further discussion, see "Rethinking Federal and
Provincial Jurisdiction," supra note 87; Peeling, supra note 87.
94. E.g., see supra note 43, regarding proof of Aboriginal title.
95. See generally Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 35, esp. chap. 2 and 7.
96. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 59 (para. 117) (my emphasis).
97. As Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. remarked in Sparrow, supra note 52, at 1105, in relation
to s.35(1) generally, "at the least, [it] provides a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent
negotiations can take place."  Note that this recognition of the need for negotiations, which is present
in the Delgamuukw decision as well (I am grateful to Professor Peter Russell for bringing this to my
attention), is another indication of tacit acceptance by the Court that the concept of self-government
is inherent in the communal nature of Aboriginal rights: see text accompanying notes 31-33, supra.
This is because the community possessing the rights needs to be able to choose representatives to
participate in the negotiations, and needs to have a mechanism for ratifying any agreement that is
reached.  Stated more broadly, the community must have the political authority to engage with other
governments where its communal rights are involved, and this entails self-government.  On the
exercise of this authority in relation to the signing of one of the numbered treaties, see Sharon Venne,
"Understanding Treaty 6: An Indigenous Perspective," in Asch, supra note 21, 173, esp. 189-92.
More generally, see Opekokew, supra note 30, esp. 9-15; Henderson, supra note 30, esp. 256-60.
98. For an overview of these agreements, see RCAP Report, supra note 2, vol. 2, Restructuring
the Relationship, at 720-32.
99. See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Treaty Making in the Spirit of Co-existence:
An Alternative to Extinguishment (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1995).  An exception is the
Umbrella Final Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Council for Yukon Indians and
the Government of the Yukon (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1993), by which the Yukon
Indian Nations retain their Aboriginal title to a portion of the land claim area: see RCAP Report,
supra note 2, vol. 2, Restructuring the Relationship, at 537-38.
100. E.g., see R. v. Peter Paul, [1998] N.B.J. No. 126 (Quicklaw) (N.B.C.A.), a post-
Delgamuukw decision where an alleged treaty or Aboriginal right to cut timber failed as a defence to
a charge of unlawfully removing timber from Crown lands, in part because the accused failed to prove
Aboriginal title to the lands where the timber was cut.  For critical perspectives on this issue of onus
of proof, see Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Lands and Resources: An Assessment of the Royal
Commission's Recommendations" (1997) 5:5 Canada Watch 77; Peggy J. Blair, "Prosecuting the
Fishery: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Onus of Proof in Aboriginal Fishing Cases" (1997)
20 Dalhousie Law Journal 17.  See also supra note 43.
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101. Provincial governments do not have a constitutional right to be at the table, given that Lamer
C.J. held in Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 82 (para. 175), that "jurisdiction to accept surrenders [of
Aboriginal title] lies with the federal government."  Politically, however, there is no realistic
possibility of viable agreements being reached regarding lands within provincial boundaries without
provincial participation (Professor Peter Russell pointed this out to me in a personal communication
dated 10 April 1998).  Moreover, given that the geographic extent of Aboriginal title is a major issue
to be settled and that provincial governments have a direct interest in that issue, they need to take part
in the negotiations.
102. See supra notes 5, 13, and 35, and accompanying text.
103. See text accompanying notes 23-27, supra.
104. The province might be liable as well for breach of the fiduciary duty that the Crown owes to
the Aboriginal peoples: see generally Leonard Ian Rotman, Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and
the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), esp. 244-
54.
105. Remember that this would require legislation, as executive action cannot infringe rights
without unequivocal legislative authorization: see supra note 56.  Also, legislation of this sort might
violate the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c.44, s.1(a), as it would interfere with the enjoyment
of property in a way that would probably discriminate on the basis of race or national origin.  There
is authority in Australia that legislation directed at infringing the property rights of indigenous peoples
is discriminatory, and offends the rights to own and inherit property that are recognized by Article
5 (v) and (vi) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (in force 4 January 1969), which both
Australia and Canada have ratified: see Mabo v. Queensland [No. 1] (1988), 166 C.L.R. 186 (Aust.
H.C.), and discussion in "Racial Discrimination," supra note 56, at 36-38.  While Parliament can get
around the Canadian Bill of Rights by resorting to the notwithstanding clause in s.2, the International
Convention might still be offended.  In any case, Canada's reputation as a proponent of human rights
would be seriously tarnished.
106. There is a parallel here with the situation the federal government found itself in as a result of
the St. Catherine's Milling decision, supra note 11, whereby the provinces received the benefits of
Indian land surrenders and Canada paid the costs: see Dominion of Canada v. Province of Ontario,
[1910] A.C. 637 (P.C.).  The federal government will no doubt want to avoid getting into a similar
predicament in the context of infringement of Aboriginal title by insisting that the province concerned
agrees to pay the costs of compensation.  As Albert Peeling has written (supra note 87, at 2.1.08),
in this context "the fiduciary duties and financial interests of Canada coincide.  The two governments
will have to negotiate against one another with respect to money, rather than them both negotiating
against the aboriginal people."
107. See supra note 101.
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108. Even where Aboriginal lands are required for public purposes such as highways and airports,
the Aboriginal titleholders could retain an interest so that the lands would revert to them if they cease
to be used for those purposes.
109. See Michael Asch and Norman Zlotkin, "Affirming Aboriginal Title: A New Basis for
Comprehensive Claims Negotiations", in Asch, supra note 21, at 208.  In this respect, there is no
reason why Aboriginal title lands should be treated any differently than reserve lands: for an example
(unfortunately tainted by breach of the Crown's fiduciary obligation) of development of reserve land
without an absolute surrender, see Guerin, supra note 13.
110. Unfortunately, preliminary indications do not reveal that this is occurring.  The deal
announced by Newfoundland and Quebec in March 1998, on hydroelectric development of the
Churchill River, in face of Innu protests, is just one example: see Shawn McCarthy, "Innu short-
circuit Labrador ceremony," Globe and Mail, March 10, 1998, A1; Jeffrey Simpson, "Raining on the
Churchill Falls megaproject parade," Globe and Mail, 10 March 1998, A14.  See also Robert Matas,
"B.C. favours industry over native land claims," Globe and Mail, 14 March 1998, A12.
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